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Executive Summary (ausführliche deutsche Zusammenfassung) 
Betreiber von bisherigen Breitbandnetzen (der ersten Generation) sehen sich mit einem 
wachsenden Bedarf nach immer breitbandintensiveren Informations- und Kommunikations-
diensten konfrontiert. Der Bedarf geht auf Nachfrageseite etwa einher mit interaktiven 
Multimedia-Diensten, wie Video on Demand, HD Fernsehen, 3-D Anwendungen, eHealth, 
eGovernment, cloud computing sowie insbesondere auch mit der massiven Verbreitung von 
mobilen Breitbanddiensten („mobile apps“), die ebenfalls hohe Anforderungen an die 
Datenübertragungskapazität in mobilen und festnetzgebundenen Kommunikationsnetzen mit 
sich bringen. Angebotsseitig werden in Zusammenhang mit dem Ausbau neuer 
Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen und in Verbindung mit einer zunehmenden Verbreitung von 
darauf basierenden Internetdiensten hohe Produktivitäts- und Wachstumspotentiale erwartet.  
Die Erneuerung bestehender Breitbandinfrastruktur bzw. deren (teilweiser) Ersatz durch 
Glasfasernetze im Bereich des Teilnehmeranschlussnetzes erfordert jedoch sehr hohe 
Investitionsvolumina und geht mit hohen Risiken einher. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich 
daher insbesondere auch die Frage nach der optimalen Gestaltung regulatorischer 
Rahmenbedingungen, die effiziente Investitionen fördern und Investitionsrisiken minimieren 
sollten. In Hinblick auf die Anreize, neue Kommunikationsinfrastruktur zur Verfügung zu 
stellen, ist hier zunächst die Auswirkung relevanter sektorspezifischer (ex ante) 
Regulierungsverpflichtungen auf die dynamische Effizienz zu untersuchen. Konkret wird im 
Rahmen dieser Untersuchung dabei folgende Forschungsfrage beantwortet: Wie wirken 
sektorspezifische Zugangsverpflichtungen bzw. ein regulatorisch induzierter 
Dienstewettbewerb einerseits sowie infrastrukturbasierter Wettbewerb andererseits auf die 
Investitionsanreize von Anbietern glasfaserbasierter Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen? 
[iii] 
Auf Basis eines aktuellen Paneldatensatzes für (bislang regulierte) 
Incumbentunternehmen und die Gruppe (bislang unregulierter) alternativer Anbieter in den 
EU27 Mitgliedsstaaten für die Jahre von 2004 bis 2013 wird zum einen der Einfluss relevanter 
Vorleistungsregulierungsinstrumente auf die Investitionsanreize in panelökonometrischen 
Spezifikationen geschätzt. Neben dem Einfluss von Regulierungsvariablen wird zum anderen 
auch der wettbewerbliche Einfluss von Mobilfunk- und bestehenden festnetzgebundenen 
Breitbandnetzen bestimmt. Zugleich berücksichtig die empirische Untersuchung explizit 
relevante nachfrageseitige Determinanten sowie die wesentlichen Determinanten der 
Netzausbaukosten. Die ökonometrische Spezifikation modelliert dabei auch den dynamischen 
Verlauf des Investitionsausbaus. Eine große Anzahl an Kontrollvariablen sowie 
unterschiedliche Modellspezifikationen und Schätzverfahren sollen die Robustheit der 
erzielten Ergebnisse gewährleisten. 
Im Ergebnis zeigt sich zum einen, dass mit einer Intensivierung des regulatorisch 
induzierten Dienstewettbewerbs um einen Prozentpunkt eine Verringerung der 
Investitionstätigkeiten im Bereich des Glasfaserausbaus um 1.58% bis zu 5.30% einhergeht. 
Als für den Dienstewettbewerb relevante Vorleistungsregulierungen werden dabei die 
Entbündelungsverpflichtung, der Bitstromzugang sowie der Wiederverkauf von 
Breitbandanschlüssen berücksichtigt. Umso effektiver eine hierauf basierende 
Breitbandvorleistungsregulierung in Form des resultierenden Dienstewettbewerbs umgesetzt 
wird, umso geringer werden somit die ex ante Anreize für Infrastrukturinvestitionen in neue 
glasfaserbasierte Kommunikationsnetze ausgeprägt sein. Bezüglich der für Migrations- und ex 
ante Investitionsanreize relevanten Höhe der Entbündelungsentgelte zeigt sich zudem ein in 
Hinblick auf die Gesamtinvestitionen positiver Zusammenhang: Umso höher das 
Entbündelungsentgelt von der Regulierungsbehörde gesetzt wird, umso höher sind damit die 
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einhergehenden Investitionsanreize im Durchschnitt. Das diesbezügliche Ausmaß ist dabei 
auch abhängig von der Effektivität der Entbündelungsverpflichtung, wobei hier gilt, dass je 
größer der Anteil der entbündelten Leitungen (gemessen an der Anzahl aller 
Endkundenbreitbandanschlüsse), desto stärker der positive Zusammenhang zwischen der 
Höhe des Entbündelungsentgelts und den glasfaserspezifischen Investitionstätigkeiten. Der 
Gesamteffekt wird daher in einem Land wie Deutschland, mit einem überdurchschnittlich 
hohen Marktanteil an entbündelten Leitungen, entsprechend stark ausfallen. Die empirische 
Analyse stützt damit die überwiegende Anzahl der bisherigen Ergebnisse theoretischer und 
empirischer Untersuchungen.2  
In Hinblick auf den wettbewerblichen Einfluss des Mobilfunkwettbewerbs zeigt sich 
zum anderen ein tendenziell negativer Zusammenhang, wobei sich dieser nicht in allen 
Modellrechnungen als statistisch signifikant erwies. Dies ist dennoch ein Hinweis darauf, dass 
mobile Breitbanddienste bereits ein Substitut zum festnetzgebundenen Breitbandanschluss 
darstellen und einen derart hohen Wettbewerbsdruck auf festnetzgebundene Breitbanddienste 
ausüben, dass damit ex ante Investitionsanreize im Festnetzbereich gesenkt werden. Es zeigen 
sich ferner Hinweise darauf, dass bei bereits flächendeckend vorhandener kupferbasierter 
Infrastruktur des Incumbent-Unternehmens („legacy“) in der kurzfristigen Betrachtung ein 
negativer Zusammenhang mit Investitionstätigkeiten in Glasfaser zu beobachten ist. 
Umgekehrt gehen mit der bestehenden Breitbandinfrastruktur der Kabelnetzbetreiber positive 
Investitionsanreize für den Glasfaserausbau einher. Diese Unterschiede können mit den 
jeweils unterschiedlichen zusätzlichen Ausbaukosten der existierenden Netze sowie der 
Vorleistungsregulierung des Incumbents erklärt werden. 
                                                            
2 Vgl. Briglauer & Frübing (2014) für einen aktuellen deutschsprachigen Überblick über bisherige 
theoretische und empirische Studien. 
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In diesem Zusammenhang konnte auch gezeigt werden, dass mit einer gut etablierten 
Breitbandinfrastruktur der ersten Generation auch erhebliche kundenseitige Wechselkosten 
einhergehen. Neben nachfrageseitigen Wechselbarrieren bzw. einer ausgeprägten 
Substitutionsbeziehung zwischen bestehenden Breitbanddiensten und glasfaserbasierten 
Breitbanddiensten erweisen sich gegenwärtig vor allem auch die sektorspezifische 
Regulierungspolitik bzw. die für bestehende und künftige Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen 
vorgesehenen Vorleistungsverpflichtungen als Hemmnis für umfangreichere 
Investitionstätigkeiten im Bereich des Ausbaus glasfaserbasierter Zugangsrealisierungen. Zwar 
unterliegt der Glasfaserausbau in den EU27 Staaten einem, wenn im Durchschnitt auch auf 
geringem Niveau stattfindenden, dynamischen Anpassungsprozess. Dennoch bleibt es fraglich, 
inwiefern der gegenwärtige EU-Regulierungsrahmen nicht den von der Europäischen 
Kommission in ihrer „Digitalen Agenda“ selbst gesetzten Ausbau- und Versorgungszielen 
entgegensteht. In weitest gehender Übereinstimmung mit der bisherigen empirischen Evidenz 
zeigen die vorliegenden Untersuchungsergebnisse vielmehr, dass deregulatorische 
Maßnahmen in Hinblick auf die Breitbandinfrastruktur der ersten und nächsten Generation und 
die dynamische Effizienz erforderlich wären.  
[vi] 
Abstract 
Fibre-deployment of next-generation communications networks is currently a major challenge 
for investing firms as well as for national regulators and is also subject to hot debates at EU 
level. This work examines the role of regulatory policies and competition controlling for relevant 
supply and demand side factors. Our econometric model employs dynamic panel data methods 
that take into account potential endogeneity due to omitted heterogeneity, reverse causality 
and the dynamic investment specification. 
Our results indicate that relevant forms of previous broadband access regulations have 
had a negative impact on investment in new infrastructure. Furthermore, infrastructure-based 
competition from mobile operators and the replacement effect stemming from the incumbents’ 
existing infrastructure exert a negative impact on ex ante investment incentives. As regards the 
dynamics of the adjustment process, we find that there are both short-term and long-term 
effects towards the desired infrastructure level.  
  
[1] 
1 Introduction and motivation  
During the last decade fibre-deployment of telecommunication access networks (“second” or 
“Next Generation Access (networks)” – NGA(N)) became a major issue for national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) as well as for investing firms. Operators of copper- and coax-based (“first 
generation”) broadband networks have to speed up their networks to fulfil needs for high-
bandwidth demanding multimedia services such as streamed video on demand, high definition 
television, 3-D applications, cloud computing, Web 2.0 services. Moreover, providers of 
wireline first-generation broadband networks are confronted with an increasing capacity 
demand of mobile operators who are subject to an explosion of mobile broadband services. 
However, the need for network and capacity upgrades not only comes from the demand-side 
but proponents of a broad-scale roll-out of NGAN also argue with reference to the general-
purpose technology character (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995) of NGANs and related spillover 
effects: NGANs are expected to induce significant productivity improvements and growth 
across major economic sectors such as health, electricity and transport. Numerous studies 
exist that provide evidence on the positive impact of first-generation broadband infrastructure 
in particular on employment, productivity and economic growth.1 In a similar vein, proponents 
of a broad-scale fibre-deployment argue that NGA infrastructure creates new jobs in 
information and communications technologies (ICT) and other related industries and involves a 
huge potential for productivity increases and GDP growth.2  
                                                            
1 See inter alia Röller and Waverman (2001), Koutroumpis (2009) and Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and 
Wößmann (2011) for the impact on GDP growth, Garbacz and Thompson (2007) for the impact on global 
productive efficiency and Etro (2009) for the impact on business creation and employment.  
2 OECD (2009) argues that even slight spill-over effects are sufficient for justifying subsidies for NGA 
broad-scale deployment.  
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However, as deployment of NGANs comes along with high investment requirements and 
risks,3 identifying the right policy measures becomes crucial. To the extent that investment in 
NGANs and a higher related level of adoption of NGA-based services is welfare enhancing, 
dynamic efficiency becomes an important policy goal. Regarding ex ante NGA investment, the 
“Averch-Johnson” effect (too much capital employed) can be expected to be small because 
service-based as well as infrastructure-based competition has already transformed monopoly-
like market structures into much more competitive ones during the last two decades of 
liberalization and sector-specific regulation. Also, migration towards NGA infrastructure 
constitutes typically more symmetric markets with new market players (Briglauer & Gugler, 
2013) and thus even higher levels of competition. Moreover, as argued above, one can expect 
substantial positive externalities of NGA investment that are not captured in the markets.  
With regard to the role of NRAs, the question thus arises whether the emerging NGA 
infrastructure should be subject to access regulations or whether “softer” regulations such as a 
temporary removal of ex ante obligations (“regulatory holidays”) should be granted and how 
existing broadband regulations, in particular the level of the relevant wholesale access 
charges, impact migration incentives to NGANs? In view of the comparatively strict EU access 
regulations imposed on the old broadband infrastructure and as foreseen for emerging NGA 
infrastructure (Vogelsang, 2014; Briglauer & Gugler, 2013; European Commission, 2010a), we 
would like to examine the following research questions related to the group of EU27 member 
states which are all subject to the same regulatory framework: i) what is the impact of ex ante 
                                                            
3 The renewal of existing networks and their (partial) replacement by fibre-optic infrastructure are of 
much greater magnitude than the previous investments required for upgrading first generation copper 
networks to facilitate broadband services and add up to billions of euros for a nationwide NGA 
deployment (FTTH Council Europe, 2012a). 
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broadband access regulations in terms of the regulated wholesale access charge and related 
service-based competition on NGA investment? ii) what is the impact of infrastructure-based 
competition stemming from the mobile sector and first-generation wireline broadband 
infrastructures on second-generation (NGA) infrastructure?  
Our empirical investigation utilizes a comprehensive and a most recent panel data set 
for EU27 member states for the years from 2004 to 2013. Our econometric estimation 
techniques explicitly account for the endogeneity bias arising from the dynamic investment 
specification and from potential endogeneity due to omitted heterogeneity or reverse causality. 
Furthermore, we employ a set of different regulatory variables that have only been used 
separately in the empirical literature so far. In particular, we measure regulation in terms of the 
unbundling charge which is the most relevant wholesale access charge as regards migration 
incentives to NGANs as well as by the extent of service-based competition that expresses the 
effectiveness of all forms of broadband access regulations imposed under the EU framework. 
The three relevant access obligations include in ascending order of investment requirements 
and scope for product differentiation: i) pure “reselling” services that only offer some scope of 
differentiation related to retailing the services; ii) wholesale access based on “bitstreaming” 
and iii) “unbundling the local loop (ULL)” which offers the highest degree of quality 
differentiation. In addition, we use a formal regulatory density index as a robustness variable. 
In a similar vein, we take account of the relevant forms of infrastructure-based competition 
stemming from i) mobile (wireless) networks (“intermodal”) and ii) wireline first-generation 
broadband networks (“intramodal”). In line with the previous literature our results indicate a 
negative impact of broadband access regulations on dynamic efficiency in terms of lower total 
NGA investment, and that the first-generation infrastructure stock of the incumbent gives rise 
to a replacement effect, which is not the case for cable entrant operators. Furthermore, we find 
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that the size of the previous broadband market exerts a positive impact, whereas a high rate of 
broadband saturation establishes substantial switching costs as regards migration to NGA-
based services. In addition, we show that the basic results related to NGA investment also carry 
over to the corresponding output related measure of NGA adoption. A multiplicity of methods in 
conjunction with a broad set of control variables ensures the robustness of our results. 
Section 2 first provides a brief overview of the industry background and outlines the 
relevant NGAN scenarios. Section 3 reviews the recent and NGA-related empirical literature 
focusing on the relation between NGA investment and broadband access regulations. Section 4 
then outlines testable hypotheses concerning the role of sector-specific access regulations and 
regulatory-induced service-based competition as well as infrastructure-based competition. 
Section 5 describes our panel data set. Section 6 presents the empirical baseline specification 
and our identification strategy. Section 7 discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 8 
summarizes and compiles relevant policy recommendations. 
2 Industry background: Relevant NGAN scenarios 
As indicated in the introduction, bandwidth of existing first-generation broadband networks is 
limited. In order to realise NGA characteristic connection speed and enable NGA specific 
applications, it is necessary to shorten the length of the copper-based local loops by placing 
the transmission equipment closer to the retail customers’ premises, e.g. in the cabinets which 
house distribution frames (referred to as “fibre to the curb/cabinet” (FTTC)). Even higher 
bandwidths can be achieved if the final copper-wire line is extended to or into the building 
(Fibre to the building (FTTB)). In case where technical and economic considerations render it 
feasible to also renew or replace the remaining in-house wiring and hence to eliminate copper 
lines entirely, fibre can be directly deployed to the individual apartment or home (“fibre to the 
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home” - FTTH) (Briglauer, Gugler & Ecker 2013:144). In addition to these deployment scenarios, 
the roll-out of high-speed communications networks might also be realised by upgrading 
traditional cable television networks based on DOCSIS 3.0 technology (referred to as “fibre-to-
the-last-amplifer” (FTTLA)).  
In the following we will use the generic term “fibre to the x” (FTTx) to refer to any NGA 
broadband networks using either FTTH/B/C or FTTLA architectures.4  
3 Empirical evidence  
Empirical literature related to the impact of broadband access regulations can be divided into 
two broad categories: i) quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on NGA investment and ii) 
quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on NGA adoption. We also consider the latter 
category here, since most of the empirical studies refer to measures of adoption due to data 
availability and as some authors explicitly argue measures of adoption are output-related and 
hence might provide a better proxy for welfare in efficiently functioning markets (Crandall, 
Jeffrey & Ingraham, 2013:266). 
Briglauer et al. (2013) were the first to investigate the determinants of NGA investment 
in terms of homes passed by FTTx connections using data for the years from 2005 to 2011. Their 
empirical specification incorporates EU27 country-level data based on a small number of 
observations. The authors find that the more effective service-based competition is, the more 
negative is the impact on NGA deployment. Competitive pressure from cable and mobile 
networks affects NGA deployment in a non-linear manner.  
                                                            
4 Mobile broadband networks based on the wireless communication standard “Long Term Evolution” 
(LTE) might reach similar coverage and adoption in view of the enormous popularity of mobile apps and 
also compete in terms of quality of service levels with FTTx architectures in the mid-term. 
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Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) were the first to estimate the effects of broadband 
access regulation on FTTx adoption with data from EU27 countries for the years from 2002 to 
2007. Hence, this work covers the NGA roll-out at the very early stage. The authors find that 
countries where unbundled local loops or bitstream unbundling is more effective experience 
lower fibre adoption. In turn, infrastructure-based competition exerts a positive impact on fibre 
adoption.  
Samanta, Martin, Guild and Pan (2012) examine the demand-side determinants of high-
speed broadband deployment using ITU and OECD data on the number of FTTx connections for 
25 countries for the years from 1999 to 2009. The authors employ a dummy variable to capture 
the extent of unbundling regulation and find that this variable has no significant impact on NGA 
adoption.  
Bacache, Bourreau and Gaudin (2014) examine the incentives embedded in the EU 
regulatory framework on migration from old to new access infrastructures using data from 15 
European member states for 17 semesters over the period from July 2002 to July 2010. The 
authors relate the number of access lines based on FTTx access to the number of unbundling 
and bitstream lines in order to test the validity of the so-called “ladder of investment” 
hypothesis (Cave and Vogelsang 2003; Cave 2006) according to which, regulatory-induced 
service-based competition serves as a stepping stone for entrants to engage progressively in 
backward integration. Whereas the authors find some support for the ladder of investment 
hypothesis for the migration from bitstream access to local loop unbundling at the lower rungs 
of the ladder, there is no empirical support for the hypothesis that the presence of multilayer 
access regulation to local loop encourages entrants to invest in NGA infrastructures. 
Finally, Briglauer (2014) investigates the determinants of NGA adoption based on FTTx 
subscriptions for EU27 member states for the years from 2004 to 2013. The author finds that 
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stricter previous broadband regulations in terms of unbundling, bitstream access and resale 
access obligations have a negative impact, while competitive pressure from first-generation 
broadband and mobile networks affects NGA adoption in a non-linear manner.  
Summarizing, only one study that uses OECD and ITU data for FTTx adoption finds 
insignificant results. Otherwise, the empirical literature clearly indicates that all studies that 
employ EU data or data from European countries find a negative impact of ex ante access 
regulations or related service-based competition on NGA deployment in terms of aggregate FTTx 
investment or FTTx adoption and hence a negative impact on dynamic efficiency or welfare. This 
appears to be largely in line with the older broadband related literature as surveyed in Cambini 
and Jiang (2009:571) who find that “[t]he majority concludes that local loop unbundling based 
on forward-looking cost methodology discourages both ILECs and CELECs from investing in 
networks.” 
The literature review also indicates that there are still very few contributions that utilize 
NGA-related data with only one study utilizing NGA specific investment data which is, however, 
based on a rather small sample of observations due to the natural data limitations associated 
with the NGA deployment process. Our data set accommodates a much larger number of 
observations and variables which increases the precision of estimates considerably and also 
provides a means for testing the robustness of the present estimation results. Furthermore, 
none of the reviewed contributions examines the impact of all the relevant regulatory and 
competition variables as outlined in the introductory section. However, a presentation of the 
whole picture based on robust empirical and methodological grounds appears to be essential 
for the policy debate and still missing. This work intends to fill this gap. 
[8] 
4 Hypotheses 
Our testable hypotheses on the main variables of interest are deduced from the theoretical 
literature and outlined in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Section 4.3 describes relevant NGA investment 
determinants on the demand and cost sides as well as the dynamics of the NGA investment 
process.  
4.1 Sector-specific regulation and service-based competition 
The theoretical literature first suggests that less restrictive access regulations imposed on first- 
and/or second-generation infrastructure, for instance the permission of risk-sharing models 
and cooperation models, geographically differentiated access charges or temporary regulatory 
holidays in conjunction with voluntary access would be beneficial to encourage NGA 
investment, while strict forms of cost-based access regulation would lead to lower incentives 
for NGA investment (Nitsche & Wiethaus, 2011; Cambini & Silvestri, 2012; Bourreau, Cambini & 
Dogan, 2014). This gets reinforced in view of demand uncertainty (Klumpp & Su 2010) and in 
case that NGANs represent an investment in quality (Vareda, 2010) and a non-drastic 
innovation (Brito, Pereira & Vareda, 2010). It appears that these features are indeed 
characteristic to NGA deployment and hence the stricter access is regulated the lower 
investment incentives will be. This expectation also relates to the effectiveness of service-
based competition which is directly conducive to the intensity of the “treatment” of the 
individual regulatory policies (Bacache et al., 2014).  
Second, one has to consider expectations that are shaped on the basis of the existing 
infrastructure regulation although this effect is not explicitly covered in the related theoretical 
literature so far. In the particular case of NGA deployment, potential investors will ceteris 
paribus expect stricter future access regulations of NGA infrastructure, the stricter the existing 
first-generation broadband infrastructure is regulated. However, rents earned from wholesale 
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access at cost-oriented prices are lower than rents from selling infrastructure directly to retail 
customers. Expectation effects thus lower net present values and hence the ex ante incentive 
to invest for those operators who will most likely be subject to mandatory fibre access 
regulations. This gets reinforced in case risks are shifted from entrants to incumbents which is 
typically the case under standard cost-based access regimes. And vice versa, service-based 
competitors anticipate benefiting from the risk-free option due to expected mandatory access 
obligations and hence ex ante NGA investment incentives will be lower for entrants as well 
(Valetti, 2003; Pindyck, 2007). Moreover, infrastructure investors might also expect that they 
will be subject to a regulatory commitment problem and to regulatory opportunism meaning 
that the NRA has an incentive to enforce cheap wholesale access once the new infrastructure is 
established on a large scale irrespective of former decisions and announcements. Regulatory-
induced service-based competition would lead to higher NGA investment incentives only if the 
ladder of investment hypothesis holds true and induces sufficient migration to self-deployed 
NGA infrastructure or if service-based broadband competition leads to increases in variety and 
innovation and, hence, total broadband demand. This demand-increasing effect might also 
increase ex ante investment incentives for incumbents if they can appropriate profits through 
sufficiently high access charges (Foros, 2004; Kotakorpi, 2006).  
Third, in case that cost-based access regulation is imposed on the first-generation 
infrastructure by NRAs, the theoretical literature (Inderst & Peitz, 2012; Bourreau et al., 2012) 
suggests that a lower access charge for the old technology reduces NGA investment by the 
entrant as the availability of a cheap access increases opportunity costs of the entrant’s 
investment in new infrastructure. However, the literature finds countervailing effects for the 
incumbent (Bourreau et al., 2012): on the one hand, the “business migration effect” suggests 
that a lower access charge would imply that prices charged for NGA services have to be rather 
[10] 
low as well or customers would not switch, implying negative implications for investment 
incentives. On the other hand, there is the “wholesale revenue effect”, which assumes that 
high investment by the incumbent triggers high investment by the entrant, resulting in a loss of 
wholesale revenues, but this loss is smaller with lower access charges. Overall, at the firm level 
there is some ambiguity concerning the question of whether a higher or lower access charge is 
more likely to induce NGA investment by the incumbent and hence also with respect to 
aggregate NGA investment. 
Summarizing, from the theoretical literature we expect that service-based competition 
and related access regulations exert a negative impact on entrants’ investment incentives if the 
ladder of investment hypothesis does not hold true and does not dominate the other effects. 
With respect to the investment incentives of the incumbent, the overall effect is indeterminate 
to the extent that service-based competition also captures the effect of the height of regulated 
access charges and induces total demand increases. Similarly, we expect that entrants’ 
investment incentives are positively related to the height of the access charge, whereas the 
impact on NGA investment incentives of the incumbent is indeterminate. With regard to 
aggregate NGA investment the empirical literature clearly suggests that service-based 
competition as well as related access regulations exert a negative impact. Note that although 
different investment incentives can be identified at the firm level, most notably between 
regulated incumbent operators and unregulated service-based or infrastructure-based 
entrants, aggregate industry investment represents the main point of reference for policy-
makers.  
4.2 Infrastructure-based competition 
Mobile networks have become the main intermodal competitor for wireline providers both with 
respect to narrowband as well as broadband services. This phenomenon has been referred to 
[11] 
as fixed-mobile substitution (FMS), which now exerts a crucial impact on existing and future 
market structures and thus also on NGA investment incentives. Indeed, some of the empirical 
studies reviewed in section 3 found a significant and non-linear relationship between the 
extent of FMS and NGA investment. A standard interpretation of this result follows the 
reasoning in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) according to which operators 
first try to „escape” competition and capture monopolistic rents by an innovation at moderate 
levels of competition whereas at high levels of competition operators are not able any longer to 
generate sufficient future profits for investment/innovation (“Schumpeterian” effect). These 
opposing effects will then imply an “inverted U-shaped” relationship. However, as shown in 
Schmutzler and Sacco (2011) there is generally no clear prediction at the micro-level. Rather, 
the relationship depends on the definition of competitive intensity and the oligopoly framework 
and consequently investments can be increasing or decreasing functions of competition. Also, 
an inverted U-shaped relation is not necessarily more likely than a U-shaped relation. 
In view of the first-generation (intramodal) broadband infrastructure that is basically 
based on copper-lines and DSL technology of the incumbents (“legacy”) as well as coaxial 
cabling infrastructure and the hybrid-fibre technology of cable-TV network operators, we also 
have to consider the well-known “replacement” effect (Arrow, 1962). Accordingly, NGA 
investments would cannibalize rents on conventional broadband services which represent an 
opportunity cost of NGA deployment. In particular, in the case of a well-established first-
generation broadband infrastructure stock that enables high-quality broadband services and 
broad consumer acceptance, the replacement effect might be substantial and thus hinder or 
delay NGA deployment.  
Summarizing, there is no clear prediction regarding the impact of intermodal 
competition from mobile networks on NGA investment incentives. The replacement effect 
[12] 
implies that incumbent and entrant (cable) operators are reluctant to network upgrades. This 
effect will be more pronounced the lower the quality and profit differential between the first-
generation and second-generation broadband infrastructure is.  
4.3 Demand and cost controls and investment dynamics 
Both the level and the speed of NGA deployment will also be influenced by variables related to 
consumer demand and (adjustment) costs of the NGA infrastructure roll-out.  
On the one hand, costs depend on population or household density and other 
demographic characteristics. Urbanization is perhaps a better measure of deployment costs 
than household or population density, because a hypothetical move of all households to one 
city would not change average household density but would have a massive impact on average 
NGA deployment costs (Vogelsang, 2014:3). Also, the housing structure, in particular the 
number of multi-dwelling units, determines average deployment costs (FTTH Council Europe, 
2012b:24-25). On the other hand, civil engineering and construction costs (including in-house 
wiring) represent by far the most relevant cost drivers, which will also depend on topographic 
region or country-specific characteristics. Finally, one has to be aware that NGA roll-out is a 
rather time-consuming process as it involves complex technical network planning and 
standardization, and legal issues such as co-ordination with NRAs and potential access 
seekers, rights of way or other allowances such as contractual obligations with house owners 
have to be resolved beforehand. As a consequence, operators cannot immediately adjust their 
infrastructure stock to changing market conditions and it is likely that adjustment to optimal 
infrastructure stocks will take place only gradually over time. Partial adjustment towards a 
long-run optimum also captures the feature of increasing marginal costs of NGA deployment 
which reaps “low-hanging fruits” first and leaves “white areas” uncovered. 
[13] 
Demand and the willingness to pay for NGAN services depend on the overall size of the 
broadband market and the degree of innovation and the intensity of consumers’ use of 
broadband services. Whereas traditional broadband services exhibit fairly stable demand, 
demand for NGA services is much more uncertain and seems to have more luxury 
characteristics (Muselaers & Stil, 2010:6) and hence it will also depend on consumer wealth in 
general. Moreover, the demand for NGA services is also driven by a variety of consumer 
preferences, referring to the overall affinity with ICT and Internet usage and the usage intensity 
of high-speed broadband services on the part of residential or business customers. 
Consumers’ needs are furthermore determined by their average education levels, since higher 
levels of education improve e-literacy skills, which considerably increases the utility derived 
from NGA technologies. Also, more highly educated people tend to be more prone to adopting 
and experimenting with new ICT (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002:302; Briglauer, 2014). While the 
demand determinants described above drive NGA investment, consumer demand might also be 
subject to switching costs. In cases where conventional broadband services enjoy broad 
consumer acceptance in terms of quality characteristics and high market saturation or the 
incremental benefits of moving to NGA services are not large and transparent enough for 
consumers, switching costs might be substantial and hinder consumer migration and thereby 
reducing NGA investment incentives. The higher market saturation is in terms of per household 
or per capita adoption of broadband services, the lower is the remaining segment of consumers 
that can be directly migrated to NGA services without having to overcome switching costs. The 
latter reduce the profitability of NGA investment, since operators have to convince largely 
satisfied consumers to switch via offering costly price discounts or the like. 
Summarizing, the higher deployment costs are or the more unfavourable country-
specific deployment characteristics are, the lower NGA investment activities will be. With 
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respect to the investment dynamics and adjustment costs we expect that the nature of cost 
factors and institutional rigidities imply a gradual (partial) adjustment process, however, 
adjustment towards a long-run optimal infrastructure stock takes place. With respect to the 
demand determinants, we expect that willingness to pay for broadband services, the ICT 
affinity of consumers and the education level are positively related to NGA investment. Given 
that we control for demand-side variables related to the overall ICT affinity, broadband market 
saturation primarily captures switching costs that hinder migration to NGA services and thus 
lower ex ante NGA investment incentives.  
5 Data 
We use the following data sources: The European Commissions’ “Progress Report on the Single 
European Electronic Communications Market” in conjunction with its “Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard” provides yearly data on all relevant wholesale broadband access regulations as 
well as cable and DSL-related data for our wireline competition variables. In addition, we use a 
regulatory density index of “Polynomics”. Our second main source is the database of FTTH 
Council Europe, which includes annual numbers of deployed NGA lines for incumbent 
operators and the group of entrants for the EU27 member states. EUROSTAT provides data on 
population, education, housing structure and wage costs. Furthermore, we use data from 
“Marketline” on mobile competition and urbanization, data from International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) on fixed-legacy infrastructure, and data from “Euromonitor” 
on Internet usage and ICT affinity. Finally, the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” 
provide us with GDP per capita. We use a slightly unbalanced panel data set of EU27 countries 
[15] 
for the time range from 2004 to 2012 for yearly data on our independent variables and from 
2005 to 2013 for yearly data on our dependent variable.5  
All sources and variable definitions are listed and described in detail in Table A.1, while 
summary statistics are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Section 5.1 and section 5.2 below 
describe our dependent and independent variables, respectively. 
5.1 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable, fttx_total, measures the total number of NGA connections deployed 
(“homes passed”) based on all relevant FTTx technologies according to the technical definition 
in section 2. Our dependent variable represents real FTTx investment in physical units6 
deployed by European incumbent operators and the group of European entrants. Stacking this 
firm-level information on our dependent variable allows us to estimate an aggregate model on 
the basis of a sample size that is twice as large, i.e. we have a maximum of 2*(27*9) 
observations available (less the missings mentioned in footnote 5). Note that the term homes 
passed refers to the number of consumers that have potential access via FTTx, but which do not 
necessarily have a corresponding retail contract. In turn, “homes connected” represents the 
number of adopting consumers who also show a sufficient willingness to pay for at least one of 
the FTTx-based services. We employ the total number of homes connected, fttx_sub, as well as 
the total number of homes passed per household, fttx_total_w, as robustness variables.  
                                                            
5 Data availability varies randomly by country; most notably, the European Commission does not provide 
market data for Bulgaria and Romania until 2005, which, creates four missing values. Apparently, this 
cannot be attributed to NGA deployment activities in these countries.  
6 We consider a real measure of investment superior to monetary measures of investment, for both 
empirical and conceptual reasons as argued in Briglauer et al. (2013:footnote 17).  
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5.2 Independent variables 
In line with our hypotheses in sections 4.1 to 4.3, we can divide the explanatory variables into 
the following three categories: i) regulation and related service-based competition; ii) 
infrastructure-based competition; and, iii) control variables focusing on demand and cost 
determinants of NGA investment.  
Broadband access regulation is measured first by the effectiveness of service-based 
competition, sbc_bb, which is the share of regulated and actually used wholesale broadband 
lines (based on unbundling, bitstream and resale obligations) related to the total number of 
retail broadband lines. The variable sbc_bb incorporates the actual market effectiveness of 
access broadband regulations by linking these to the corresponding market outcomes 
(Bacache et al., 2014; Briglauer et al., 2013). Second, we use the unbundling access charge, 
price_ull, which stands for the access regulation that is most relevant in view of the migration 
from old to new broadband networks and is directly set by the NRAs. Third, we use a subindex 
of the “Polynomics Regulation Index”, rdi_bb, which provides a formal measure of relevant EU 
broadband access obligations as a regulatory robustness variable.7  
Infrastructure-based competition is measured in two ways: First, intermodal wireless 
competition from mobile networks is measured by the extent of FMS. The variable fms relates 
the total number of mobile lines to the total number of fixed lines. Second, the variables cable 
and legacy measure the first-generation infrastructure stock of cable and incumbent operators, 
                                                            
7 In contrast to the variable sbc_bb, the variable rdi_bb captures only the formal aspects of regulation 
and not its effectiveness and related market outcomes. Indeed, certain access regulations imposed by 
NRAs might exist on paper for years without any real effect on the relevant markets. We also use the 
variable rdi_bb as a robustness variable because it is available only up to 2010.  
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respectively, and thus the replacement effect that is related to the existing first-generation 
access infrastructure (intramodal wireline competition).  
Demand and cost shifters are included as control variables. GDP per capita, 
gdp_pc_ppp, captures income effects. The network readiness index, nri, the number of Internet 
users per capita, int_user, and the share of businesses using local area networks, 
bus_use_lan, as well as the share of the population with higher education level, edu, capture 
the overall affinity with ICT and broadband services. The stock of existing broadband lines (in 
logs), ln(bb_lines), acts as a proxy for the market size and thus, for the overall willingness to 
pay for broadband services in a country. Broadband lines per household, bb_lines_w, 
measures market saturation in terms of household adoption of conventional broadband 
services.  
With regard to deployment and adjustment costs the variables wage and labcost_con 
serve as cost proxies for the NGA construction costs. In addition, we include the share of a 
country’s urban population, urban_sh, and the number of building permits for multiple-
dwelling units, mdwell_perm, which reflect different costs due to varying shares of densely 
populated areas and housing structures.  
Finally, we include period-effects, λ, as well as country fixed-effects, θ, with the latter 
controlling for time invariant and unobserved heterogeneity. Most notably, NGA-relevant and 
country-specific fixed effects might be related to some of the main cost conditions, such as 
topographic and demographic characteristics, rights of way, regulations on digging, local 
availability of ducts and dark fibre, the costs of fibre equipment or different levels of 
(regulated) capital costs. Furthermore, demand and supply will also be influenced by public 
subsidies, which also show only limited variation as regards our analysis period.  
[18] 
6 Econometric specification 
In section 6.1 we first present our empirical baseline specification, which excludes robustness 
variables and considers a market that is not in equilibrium but explicitly accounts for an 
endogenous adjustment process. In section 6.2 we describe our estimation and identification 
strategy.  
6.1 Aggregate estimation model 
Our dependent variable provides us with firm-specific NGA investment, which allows us to 
aggregate these data by country in order to maximize the sample size. The dynamic reduced-
form model in which total NGA investment is expressed in logs,8 ln(fttx_totalitj), and summed 
over all firms j, for EU member state i and year t reads as follows: 
(1) 
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The dynamic investment adjustment process is captured by including the lagged dependent 
variable as a right-hand side regressor. If the dynamic specification is correct, then 1α  is in the 
interval [0; 1]. Equation (1) depends on the main variables of interest, i.e. regulation in terms of 
the variables sbc_bb and price_ull, and competition, in terms of the variables fms, cable and 
legacy. Note that we control for the incumbent’s replacement effect by including the variable 
legacy and the entrants’ replacement effect by controlling for the stock of entrants’ cable 
infrastructure, cable. In order to estimate non-linear relationships as regards competition from 
mobile networks and cable infrastructure, as seen in the literature, we also include the squared 
terms, fms2 and cable2, in our baseline specification. Furthermore, equation (1) incorporates 
                                                            
8 A log transformation helps to stabilize the series of our dependent variable.  
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market size and market saturation effects related to the total broadband market as captured by 
the variables ln(bb_lines) and bb_lines_w. Finally, we include a vector of demand and cost 
controls, Z, an additive error term, itε , country-specific effects, iθ , and period effects, tλ .9 
Note that equation (1) includes lagged values of all the explanatory variables in order to fully 
employ our available data set. 
6.2 Estimation and identification strategy 
Using dynamic generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) panel data estimation techniques 
allows us to take into account endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity and due to the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable as a right-hand side variable (Nickell, 1981) in 
equation (1). Moreover, the related literature (e.g. Grajek & Röller, 2011) suggests that there 
might be reverse causality patterns between investment decisions on the one hand and 
regulation or competition variables on the other. GMM estimators provide us with internal 
instruments, which appears to be a superior strategy to using external instruments in view of a 
sufficient number of time periods (t = 9) and as we have to treat several independent variables 
as (potentially) endogenous. Whereas the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) 
makes use of suitable lags of all endogenous and exogenous regressors as instruments, the 
system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) uses additional 
instruments. We use the former to keep the number of instruments as small as possible and 
because our models show only a limited degree of persistency. Furthermore, the system GMM 
estimator requires the imposition of an additional assumption on initial conditions of the 
                                                            
9 Including period effects allows us to control also for relevant and common industry developments 
during the period of our analysis such as upgrades in quality or decreases in prices (Grzybowski, 
2005:54). 
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process generating the dependent variable and thus works only under special circumstances 
(Roodman, 2009).  
We also employ a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) 
developed by Bruno (2005a,b) for dynamic unbalanced panel data and a small number of 
cross-sectional units (n = 27). Since we lag all explanatory variables in the specifications in 
equation (1), these variables can thus be considered as predetermined which mitigates 
endogeneity problems, if there is no serial correlation. In fact, pre-determinedness is 
reasonable for dynamic autoregressive models such as in equation (1) (Wooldridge, 2002:299-
300). Further endogeneity problems due to time-variant heterogeneity should be limited in view 
of our considerably large number of control variables. Finally, as argued in the related 
literature, endogeneity due to reverse causality should be limited in our case as well, since we 
relate determinants of first-generation broadband markets to emerging NGA infrastructure roll-
out.10 However, the LSDVC estimator requires strictly exogenous regressors, which represents a 
rather strong assumption, and for this reason we consider difference GMM as our main 
estimator, which is designed for models where right-hand side variables, including the lagged 
dependent variable, are not strictly exogenous.11 Yet, against the background of the different 
strengths and weaknesses of GMM and LSDVC estimators, it makes sense to employ both in 
order to ensure the robustness of our results.  
                                                            
10 See Briglauer et al. (2013) and Briglauer (2014) for more detailed justifications for this reasoning and 
statistical evidence based on Granger causality tests. Generally, as argued in Grzybowski (2005:55-56), 
NRAs react to demand and supply shocks but typically with substantial delay in view of the legislative 
and technical implementation process.  
11 Another advantage of the GMM difference estimator is that non-stationarity in aggregate time series 
can be typically removed by first differencing the series. This is an important feature, since panel unit 
root tests assume large t and thus cannot be conducted formally in our case (t = 9). 
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7 Empirical results 
Table 1 to Table 3 below show the main estimation results based on the model specification in 
equation (1). All standard errors reported are robust and permit arbitrary forms of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the ε ’s for GMM and are bootstrapped for LSDVC 
models.12  
As regards the GMM models we treat all regulatory and competition variables as well as 
the lagged dependent variable as endogenous, whereas demand and cost controls are treated 
as exogenous. We utilize the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator which is the more efficient 
alternative in case of estimation in small samples (Ro0dman, 2009) even in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (Bond, 2002). Since GMM estimators incorporate the assumption that the 
idiosyncratic errors of the untransformed specification are uncorrelated across units, we 
include period effects in all GMM estimations reported in Table 1 to Table 3 to prevent the most 
likely source of cross-correlation, i.e. contemporaneous correlation (Roodman, 2006:36). The 
key identifying assumption underlying the GMM estimator is that the error terms in the original 
specification, ε ’s, are serially uncorrelated. For all GMM models reported in Table 1 to Table 3 
the Arellano-Bond (AR(1) and AR(2)) tests for zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors 
reject at order 1 but not at order 2 at conventional levels. This implies, most importantly, that 
there is no evidence of serial correlation in the original error. Finally, the Hansen tests do not 
suggest rejection of the overidentifying restrictions at the conventional levels in all GMM 
models and the Wald tests (Χ2 statistics) indicate a high significance of all model regressors in 
all specifications.  
                                                            
12 Stata 12.1 is used to estimate the regressions. 
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7.1 Main results 
Table 1 shows the main regression results for alternative specifications as regards regulatory 
variables, normalization of the dependent variable (ln(fttx_total_w) is used in regr. (6) instead 
of ln(fttx_total)) and selection of control variables (regr. labelled “Full” and “Final”). Whereas 
“Full” indicates the inclusion of all available control variables, insignificant or the least 
significant demand and cost controls are excluded in “Final” regressions. The basic structure of 
regression estimates that we discuss below is robust in light of these differences in model 
specifications.  
To begin with, Table 1 shows that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
highly significant and substantial in all regressions (including those in Table 2 and Table 3) 
indicating that the dynamic specification is adequate. As expected, the coefficient is between 0 
and 1 and lies in the interval of [0.2234; 0.4142], which indicates that there are adjustment 
costs underlying NGA deployment until the long-run desired infrastructure stock is reached. The 
coefficients for the long-run relationships can be derived from the dynamic model as 
)1/( 1αβ −k  and )1/( 1αγ −l . Therefore, the long-run coefficients of the static representation 
show substantially higher absolute values. 
With regard to the group of regulatory variables, we first infer from Table 1 that the 
negative impact of service-based competition dominates at the aggregate investment level. The 
coefficient of the variable sbc_bb is significantly negative in all model specifications (including 
those in Table 2 and Table 3). Furthermore, the economic impact is substantial, as the 
estimates indicate that an increase in the intensity of service-based competition by 1 
percentage point, decreases total NGA investment by at least ~1.58% and up to a maximum of 
~5.30%. This strongly supports our hypothesis outlined in section 4.1, according to which more 
effective regulatory-induced access obligations reduce aggregate NGA investment incentives in 
[23] 
view of the weak empirical evidence for the ladder of investment hypothesis and as regr. (1) to 
(6) also explicitly control for the demand-expanding effect via the market size variable 
ln(bb_lines). In regr. (2) we utilize our regulatory robustness variable rdi_bb and drop sbc_bb. 
It appears that the formal regulation index picks up well the effect of service-based 
competition, suggesting also that the latter captures access regulations adequately. The 
access charge in terms of the unbundling variable, price_ull, however, is insignificant in all 
specifications (including those in Table 2 and Table 3). This might be due to the opposing 
investment incentives as identified in the theoretical literature (Bourreau et al., 2012) but is 
likely also due to the low degree of variation in the variable price_ull. In particular, as Bacache 
et al. (2014:205-206) point out, only a very few unbundling access charge increases have been 
imposed by NRAs in the past, which makes identification of the overall effect difficult. In order 
to circumvent this problem, we introduce additional variation by referring to a measure that 
captures the effectiveness of the unbundling regime. Accordingly, the interaction term i_ 
price_ull_sh combines the unbundling charge, price_ull, with the respective unbundling market 
share, ms_ull. The latter is bound between 0 and 1 where the upper limit indicates that all retail 
broadband connections are offered via unbundling.13 From regr. (4) and (5) we infer that the 
coefficient estimate of the main term price_ull is still insignificant, but the interaction term now 
shows a significantly positive impact, which increases with a more effective unbundling 
regime, i.e. with a higher unbundling market share. Evaluated at the grand mean, ms_ull(average) 
=0.0997 (Table A.1), this implies that an increase in the unbundling price by one unit (1€) 
increases NGA investment in the range between 2.9% (regr. (4)) and 6.4% (regr. (5)). For a 
                                                            
13 This variable might be indeed a better representation of the overall complexity of existing real world 
unbundling regimes which include many other institutional and technical regulations besides the 
monthly access charge. 
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country like Germany, where unbundling is of high market relevance, the impact on NGA 
investment appears to be even more substantial. For instance, referring to the last observation 
period as regards our independent variables, i.e. the year 2012, the average unbundling market 
share in EU27 member states was ~15.4% (ms_ull(2012)EU27 = 0.154), whereas the corresponding 
value for Germany was ~35.2% (ms_ull(2012)Germany = 0.352). 
With regard to infrastructure-based competition from cable (cable) and mobile (fms) 
operators, we only find weak evidence of a non-linear relationship as found in the previous 
literature (Briglauer et al., 2013; Briglauer, 2014). Rather, it appears that intermodal 
competition exerts a negative net impact for all values of the variable fms, whereas intramodal 
cable competition exerts a positive net impact on NGA investment for all values of the variable 
cable. The latter finding contrasts with the impact of the first-generation broadband 
infrastructure stock of the incumbent operator, legacy, which shows a significantly negative 
coefficient estimate. The different effects might be due to substantial cost differences in 
upgrading DSL to FTTC and coax-cable to DOCSIS 3.0 technology, respectively. Whereas both 
first-generation technologies are subject to a replacement effect (opportunity costs), FTTC 
comes along with comparatively higher deployment costs. In turn, the coax-cable infrastructure 
experiences low upgrading and hence lower total costs which opens up the potential of 
migrating the existing subscriber base to NGA/DOCSIS 3.0 services with higher average 
revenues implying a more favourable profit differential. Furthermore, the variable legacy 
presumably also captures the effect of the incumbent’s opportunity costs related to the 
wholesale business (referred to as the “wholesale revenue effect” in Bourreau et al., 2012). 
This interpretation is also consistent with our empirical finding of a positive net impact of the 
unbundling price on NGA investment in regr. (4) and (5). In turn, the wholesale revenue effect 
does not exist on the side of the unregulated cable operators.  
[25] 
With regard to the impact of our control variables, we start by discussing the impact of 
the demand variables. Most notably, there are strongly countervailing and significant effects 
related to the variables bb_lines_w and ln(bb_lines). As outlined in section 4.3, the former is 
supposed to capture switching costs, since other demand variables already control for ICT 
affinity of business and residential customers (bus_lan; int_user; nri; edu) and hence the 
negative coefficient of bb_lines_w is expected. Likewise, the positive coefficient estimate of 
the variable ln(bb_lines) is expected, as it captures the overall broadband market size and thus 
willingness to pay for broadband services in general. Please note that the variables bb_lines_w 
and ln(bb_lines) are correlated with the variables legacy and cable to some extent;14 however, 
dropping the latter does not change the impact of the former as shown in regr. (5).  
With respect to our cost controls, the variables wage and urban_sh show expected 
signs and significant coefficient estimates and apparently capture best deployment costs and 
topographic deployment conditions, respectively.  
                                                            
14 The reader is referred to the respective definitions in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
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Table 1: Main GMM estimation results 
(Dep.var.: ln(fttx_total) in regr. (1) to (5); ln(fttx_total_w) in regr. (6)) 
Regression nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Full_total Full_total
_r 
Final_
total 
Full_ i
_ull_price 
Final_i_ 
ull_price 
Final_
total_w 
Dep. var.(t-1) 0.3751*** 0.4025*** 0.4142*** 0.3801*** 0.2234*** 0.3299***
 (8.27) (9.52) (9.80) (8.20) (4.37) (8.14)
   
sbc_bb -1.5719**  -1.5665* -3.5791*** -5.3002*** -3.0296**
 (-2.03)  (-1.94) (-3.84) (-3.92) (-2.56)
   
price_ull 0.0054 0.0014 -0.0489 -0.0235 -0.0910 -0.0056
 (0.09) (0.02) (-0.87) (-0.35) (-1.16) (-0.08)
   
i_price_ull_sh  0.2962** 0.6463** 
  (1.96) (2.40) 
   
rdi_bb -1.9096***  
 (-2.86)  
   
fms -1.3152* -1.1435 -1.4573* -0.8434 -1.2543 -1.3004
 (-1.71) (-1.57) (-1.93) (-1.09) (-1.22) (-1.18)
   
fms2 0.0666 0.0632 0.0794 0.0380 0.0844 0.0871
 (1.36) (1.35) (1.57) (0.75) (1.29) (1.28)
   
cable -6.4695 -7.2950* 2.7985* -5.9891  1.3004
 (-1.40) (-1.67) (1.72) (-1.47)  (0.60)
   
cable2 8.5428*** 8.3089*** 7.5080***  
 (3.15) (3.16) (3.11)  
   
legacy -0.1399** -0.1013* -0.1491*** -0.1291**  -0.1590**
 (-2.26) (-1.89) (-3.08) (-2.21)  (-2.12)
   
bb_lines_w -21.09*** -18.116*** -19.553*** -23.4043*** -29.380*** -17.5572***
 (-3.89) (-4.27) (-3.46) (-3.81) (-3.91) (-3.34)
ln(bb_lines) 1.2984*** 1.2870*** 0.8152** 1.1001*** 0.8943* 0.7881*
 (5.60) (5.78) (2.40) (5.05) (1.77) (1.95)
   
bus_lan -1.3639 -1.4796 -0.9362 -1.5589 
 (-0.50) (-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.52) 
   
gdp_pc_ppp 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0002
 (1.75) (1.62) (1.20) (2.12) (1.66) (1.42)
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Table 1 continued 
int_user 2.9754 3.4243 3.4736 4.3653* 5.6578** 1.3126
 (1.52) (1.33) (1.41) (1.93) (2.15) (0.71)
   
nri -0.1974 0.1317 0.3843  1.0114
 (-0.28) (0.18) (0.49)  (1.10)
   
edu -0.0197 0.0131 -0.0175  0.0129
 (-0.29) (0.19) (-0.26)  (0.15)
   
labcost_con 0.0244  0.0284
 (1.27)  (1.33)
   
mdwell_perm -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0015  -0.0006
 (-1.08) (-1.00) (-1.64)  (-0.42)
   
wage -0.4358** -0.5459** -0.3190** -0.4219*** -0.6248** -0.657***
 (-2.48) (-2.92) (-2.03) (-2.74) (-2.50) (-2.64)
   
urban_sh 0.8373*** 0.4943** 0.6519*** 0.7507*** 0.7959*** 0.6747***
 (4.04) (2.18) (3.80) (4.06) (3.33) (2.83)
   
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
   
Constant -58.9559*** -33.3090* -39.0156*** -52.7229*** -58.2865*** -47.2432*
 (-3.55) (-1.71) (-2.78) (-3.30) (-2.94) (-1.90)
Χ2 2.6376e+10 7.09e+09 8495.8089 3.8849e+09 1896.1466 813389.19
AR(1) test  -3.8475 -3.8177 -3.8319 -3.6708 -3.6144 -3.3066
AR(2) test  -0.9840 0.0485 -1.1719 -0.7824 -1.2130 -1.2540
Hansen test (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
(p-value)   
Observations 428 428 428 428 428 428
t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. All GMM 
estimates are based on the one-step procedure and all endogenous variables in first differences are 
instrumented with their own lagged levels dated t - 2 to t - 6. All regressions include period effects and 
country-specific fixed effects which are not reported for brevity. For the Arellano-Bond tests for 
autocorrelation (AR(1) and AR(2)) and the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, test statistics and p-
values, respectively, are reported.  
* p < 0.10, ** p <0.05, *** <0.01.  
  
[28] 
7.3 Further robustness specifications  
In this section we present additional estimations to examine the robustness of the main 
estimation results depicted in Table 1. Our robustness tests refer to i) the number of 
instruments, ii) the measurement of the variables reflecting the unbundling charge, price_ull 
and i_price_ull_sh, iii) an alternative estimation technique (LSDVC instead of GMM) and iv) an 
alternative specification of the dependent variable (ln(fttx_sub) instead of ln(fttx_total)). 
The Hansen tests reported in Table 1 yield a perfect p-value of 1 which indicates that 
instrument proliferation might reduce the ability of the test to detect weak instruments. The 
number of instruments increases quadratically in t, hence we might be confronted with too 
many instruments and overfitting biases. Although the resulting number of instruments 
remains manageable with a maximum number of t - 6 lags, we further restrict the number of 
lags used as a means of examining the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the lag 
specification. In Table 2 GMM style instruments are constructed for a maximum number of t - 2 
lags in regr. (1) to (3). In addition, we use STATA’s “collapse” option (“_coll”) to further reduce 
the number of moment conditions in regr. (4) to (5).15 The Hansen test at the bottom of Table 2 
shows that gradually reducing the number of instruments produces more reasonable p-values 
ranging from 0.9958 to 0.1119. Yet, the basic structure of regression results remains the same 
in Table 2.  
First, the range of estimates of the lagged dependent variable is similar to those 
obtained in Table 1 and overall we get estimates for GMM-based regressions that lie in the 
interval [0.2158; 0.4209]. Second, the results for the regulatory variables exhibit a similar 
structure. The coefficient of the variable sbc_bb shows some additional variation suggesting 
                                                            
15 The “collapse” option creates only one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one 
instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance. 
[29] 
that the negative impact of service-based competition on NGA investment might be even higher 
compared to the estimates obtained in Table 1. With regard to the unbundling price variables, 
regr. (1) and (3) produce results that match well with the interval of estimates identified in 
Table 1 [0.2962; 0.6463] and in regr. (2) in Table 3 [0.3112]. Thirdly, the regression results in 
Table 2 confirm the impact of the main demand and cost control variables. In particular, the 
estimates provide strong evidence for the opposing and substantial effects captured by the 
variables bb_lines_w and ln(bb_lines) and, again, urbanization, urban_sh, appears to be the 
main driver on the side of cost controls. 
Table 3 reports the results for the LSDVC (regr. (1) to (3)) and for GMM estimations where 
NGA adoption (ln(fttx_sub)) appears as the dependent variable (regr. (4) to (5)). Using a 
measure of NGA adoption shows that the basic structure of coefficient estimates as presented 
in Table 1 (and Table 2) remains the same and hence it also carries over to an output related 
performance measure.16 Interestingly, the negative impact of access regulation on NGA 
investment also transfers to NGA adoption. This suggests that the negative impact on 
investment dominates the positive impact of regulation on adoption via lowering the level of 
retail prices (Briglauer, 2014). Also in line with the previous literature is the finding that some 
of the demand side variables, such as gdp_pc_ppp, int_user and edu appear to be of particular 
importance for the adoption of NGA services. Finally, the findings with respect to the lagged 
dependent variable and different specifications of the regulatory and competition variables 
appear to be robust also when using the LSDVC estimator.   
                                                            
16 In regressions (4) and (5) we also include the twice-lagged dependent variable because the AR(2) tests 
indicated model misspecification in the original estimation. As the coefficient of the twice-lagged 
dependent variable is insignificant, the condition for dynamic stability is fulfilled. 
[30] 
Table 2: GMM robustness results (unbundling charge and lags) 
(Dep.var.: ln(fttx_total)) 
Regression nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Full_GMM 
_i_2lags 
Final_GMM
_2lags 
Final_GMM
_i_2lags 
Full_GMM 
_coll 
Final_GMM
_coll 
ln(fttx_total) 0.3085*** 0.2158*** 0.2201*** 0.3287** 0.4209**
 (7.15) (3.63) (3.52) (2.06) (2.48)
    
sbc_bb -3.7883*** -3.9709*** -5.0468*** -11.9978** -10.6200**
 (-3.14) (-3.42) (-4.99) (-2.16) (-2.11)
    
price_ull -0.0854 -0.1095 -0.1699 -0.0877 -0.1417
 (-1.07) (-1.27) (-1.16) (-0.59) (-1.16)
    
i_price_ull_sh 0.4217* 0.5025**  
 (1.88) (2.01)  
    
fms 0.1104 1.5833* 1.0266 2.4334 -2.0190
 (0.07) (1.77) (1.33) (0.70) (-0.95)
    
fms2 -0.0375 -0.0929 -0.0494 -0.1148 0.1420
 (-0.40) (-1.64) (-0.97) (-0.72) (1.17)
    
cable -4.9966 23.4004**  
 (-0.87) (2.45)  
    
cable2 7.4831 -2.3203  
 (1.58) (-0.24)  
    
legacy -0.1634 -0.0369  
 (-1.61) (-0.09)  
    
bb_lines_w -30.9117*** -17.1326*** -14.9857** -52.5388*** -38.2255**
 (-4.22) (-2.64) (-2.06) (-2.65) (-2.15)
    
ln(bb_lines) 1.0327** 1.1608*** 0.9760* 2.8354* 1.8661
 (2.25) (2.62) (1.74) (1.78) (1.64)
    
bus_lan 1.6041 -0.4770 1.8995  
 (0.49) (-0.14) (0.32)  
    
gdp_pc_ppp 0.0003** 0.0002** 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0001
 (2.48) (2.54) (2.97) (0.65) (1.59)
    
int_user 4.5203* 6.2537** 5.5064** 6.4183 9.2581*
 (1.74) (2.48) (2.41) (1.42) (1.90)
    
nri 1.8659** 1.8450*  
 (2.24) (1.83)  
    
edu 0.0301 -0.2205  
 (0.40) (-1.47)  
[31] 
Table 2 continued 
mdwell_perm -0.0001 -0.0015  
 (-0.11) (-0.83)  
    
labcost_con  0.0553  
  (1.16)  
    
wage -0.8013*** -0.3275 -0.3977* -0.3960 1.0735
 (-2.72) (-1.58) (-1.75) (-0.91) (1.47)
    
urban_sh 1.0256*** 0.9225*** 0.6509* 2.2027*** 0.8023
 (4.33) (2.81) (1.94) (2.60) (1.61)
    
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
   
Constant -81.5887***  
 (-3.51)  
Χ2 626588.5189 422.8632 520.4694 782.3861 782.7940
AR(1) test  -3.6976 -2.2246 -2.4848 -2.1904 -2.4246
AR(2) test  -1.1088 -1.4649 -1.5859 0.0826 -0.9590
Hansen test (1.000) 0.9958 0.9983 0.4850 0.1119
(p-value)   
Observations 428 428 428 428 428
t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. All GMM 
estimates are based on the one-step procedure. In regr. (1) to (3) endogenous variables in first 
differences are instrumented with a maximum number of 2 lags of their own levels, i.e. the lagged levels 
dated t - 2 are used as instruments. In regr. (4) to (5) we used STATA’s “collapse” option provided in the 
command “xtabond2”. When using xtabond2 (instead of STATA’s original “xtabond” command), 
however, STATA does not include a constant term in GMM-diff estimations. Comparison of regr. (1) to (3) 
shows that exclusion of the constant term only has a moderate impact. All regressions include country-
specific fixed effects as well as period effects which are not reported for brevity. For the Arellano-Bond 
tests for autocorrelation (AR(1) and AR(2)) and the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, 
corresponding test statistics and p-values, respectively, are reported.  
* p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
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Table 3: Robustness results (LSDVC and GMM subscriptions) 
(Dep.var.: ln(fttx_total) in regressions (1) to (3); ln(fttx_sub) in regressions (4) to (5)) 
Regression nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Full_ 
LSDVC 
Full_i
LSDVC 
Final_
LSDVC 
Full_sub 
_GMM 
Full_sub_r
_GMM 
Dep.var(t-1) 0.5593*** 0.5513*** 0.5752*** 0.3378*** 0.3632***
 (13.03) (12.86) (14.12) (4.33) (3.94)
    
Dep.var(t-2)  -0.0239 -0.0543
  (-0.64) (-1.44)
    
sbc_bb -2.3861* -3.8625** -2.3495* -2.3110** -2.4204**
 (-1.93) (-2.51) (-1.88) (-2.27) (-2.06)
    
price_ull -0.0182 -0.0502 -0.0207 0.0153
 (-0.40) (-1.06) (-0.48) (0.34)
    
i_price_ull_sh  0.3112*  
  (1.77)  
    
rdi_bb  -0.0007
  (-0.00)
    
fms -0.4770 -0.3395 -0.5590 -1.4494*** -0.8625
 (-0.64) (-0.44) (-0.78) (-2.66) (-1.38)
    
fms2 0.0048 0.0006 0.0136 0.0629** 0.0258
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.26) (2.10) (0.71)
    
cable -6.3010** -4.9659 -6.5407** 1.9997 -2.4592
 (-2.06) (-1.59) (-2.46) (1.06) (-0.60)
    
cable2 8.6867*** 7.5363*** 9.3140*** 4.9203*
 (3.44) (2.95) (3.92) (1.65)
    
legacy -0.1629*** -0.1523*** -0.1590*** -0.0694 -0.0444
 (-2.83) (-2.60) (-2.93) (-1.42) (-0.83)
    
bb_lines_w -14.1515** -15.0065** -11.5538** -10.3747* -14.6078***
 (-2.45) (-2.56) (-2.46) (-1.94) (-2.65)
    
ln(bb_lines) 1.6169*** 1.1272* 1.5364*** 0.4257 0.7765*
 (2.96) (1.92) (4.55) (1.14) (1.67)
    
bus_lan 0.1819 0.3788  
 (0.09) (0.19)  
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Table 3 continued 
gdp_pc_ppp 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
 (2.82) (3.11) (3.34) (3.72) (3.72)
    
int_user 1.3606 1.7563 4.1802** 2.9389*
 (0.43) (0.56) (2.28) (1.92)
    
nri 0.4124 0.4214  
 (0.64) (0.65)  
    
edu -0.0049 -0.0049 0.0069** 0.0109***
 (-1.05) (-1.05) (2.37) (3.25)
    
mdwell_perm -0.0005 -0.0007  
 (-0.48) (-0.63)  
    
wage -0.3308** -0.3678** -0.3741** -0.2395* -0.2098
 (-1.99) (-2.21) (-2.24) (-1.67) (-1.56)
    
urban_sh 0.9511*** 0.8840*** 0.9929*** 0.7146*** 0.9322***
 (3.78) (3.40) (4.95) (3.48) (3.60)
    
Year dummies NO NO NO YES YES
    
Constant  -48.3668*** -70.4924***
  (-3.04) (-3.40)
Χ2  799.5048 729.7756
AR(1) test   -1.6815 -1.8673
AR(2) test   -1.4311 -1.2170
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
 (1.000) (1.000)
Observations 480 480 480 422 422
t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. All GMM 
estimates are based on the one-step procedure. In regr. (4) to (5) endogenous variables in first 
differences are instrumented with their own lagged levels dated t - 2 to t - 6. Note that using ln(fttx_sub) 
as the dependent variable involves six additional missing observations (compared to GMM regressions 
with the dependent variable ln(fttx_total). All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Whereas 
GMM estimations in regr. (4) to (5) also include period effects, we did not include year dummies for 
LSDVC estimations, because they were not jointly significant. For the Arellano-Bond tests for 
autocorrelation (AR(1) and AR(2)) and the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, test statistics and 
p-values, respectively, are reported. The LSDVC standard errors in regr. (1) to (3) are bootstrapped based 
on 100 iterations with bias correction initialized by the Arellano-Bond estimator for estimates up to order 
O(1/T). Note that there are no standard post-estimation tests available in STATA for the user written 
“xtlsdvc” (Bruno, 2005b) command. 
* p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.   
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8 Summary and conclusions 
This work identifies the determinants of NGA investment using a recent and comprehensive 
panel data set for EU27 member states and multiple estimation methods, which enables robust 
inference in order to truly inform the ongoing policy debate at the national and EU level. We 
find strong evidence that previous broadband access regulations imposed on first-generation 
(legacy) infrastructure exert a significant and negative impact on aggregate NGA investment 
incentives. This effect can be found for the height of the relevant access charge (unbundling) as 
well as for regulatory-induced service-based competition, which is directly contingent on 
access regulations. Whereas there is some ambiguity as regards the theoretical effects at the 
firm level, there is a clear evidence with respect to the overall effect in terms of total NGA 
investment: Accordingly, we find that an increase in the intensity of service-based competition 
by 1 percentage point, decreases total NGA investment by at least ~1.58% and up to ~5.30%. As 
regards the impact of the unbundling charge, our results show that a higher access charge 
increases total NGA investment and that this effect gets more pronounced the more effective 
the unbundling regime is, i.e. with a higher unbundling market share. In view of the above, our 
results provide no empirical support for the ladder of investment hypothesis. These findings 
correspond well with the previous empirical and theoretical literature. 
As regards the impact of infrastructure-based competition from mobile and cable 
networks our results are inconclusive and do not find a non-linear impact as found in the 
related empirical literature. The latter might result from the fact that polynomical terms show 
good in-sample fit but lower out of-sample validity. However, we find some evidence that the 
incumbent’s legacy infrastructure is subject to a replacement effect which is not the case for 
the first-generation infrastructure of cable operators. These differences in the results can be 
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plausibly related to differences in network-upgrading costs and with respect to the wholesale 
revenue effect, which only impacts on the profitability of the regulated incumbent operator. 
With regard to the impact of demand- and cost-side factors, our results show that the 
size of the conventional broadband market has a very strong impact on NGA investment 
incentives, whereas a highly saturated broadband market involves strong switching costs that 
hinder migration to NGA services. Regarding the cost side, we find that the level of urbanization 
appears to be a highly important determinant of NGA investment. Moreover, our results 
indicate that NGA deployment is subject to adjustment cost.  
Whereas most of the explanatory variables represent market-driven outcomes or 
country-specific conditions, regulatory variables represent discretionary policy decisions of 
NRAs. As our results indicate, strict access regulations exert not only a significantly negative 
but also a substantial impact on NGA investment decisions, which should be taken into careful 
consideration in future regulatory decision making. According to our results, and in line with 
the vast majority of the previous and related literature, deregulatory approaches imposed on 
first- and second-generation infrastructure lead to an increase in NGA investment and, most 
likely, also to welfare gains, not least because of the currently rather low NGA deployment 
levels in most EU member states. In this view, the existing regulatory framework in Europe is at 
odds with the ambitious NGA deployment and adoption goals of the “Digital Agenda” 
(European Commission, 2010b).  
Regarding the welfare implications, however, we only provide some tentative evidence, 
and further research is required here. The same applies as regards empirical research based on 
firm-level data that also allows tests of differential investment incentives and strategic effects 
as predicted by the theoretical literature.   
[36] 
Appendix 
See Tables A.1 to A.2 
Table A.1: Variable description and sources 
Variable Description Source*
 
Dependent variable(s) 
 
FTTx lines, 
fttx_total 
(fttx_total_w) 
Total number of homes passed by FTTx technologies. 
“Homes passed” is the total number of premises. Premise 
is a home or place of business. (normalized to a country’s 
total number of households) 
©FTTH Council 
Europe(a) 
©Euromonitor(b) 
(households) 
FTTx subscriptions, 
fttx_sub 
Total number of subscribers in terms of “homes 
connected by FTTx technologies. Subscribers is a premise 
that uses at least one service in this connection under a 
commercial contract  
©FTTH Council 
Europe(a) 
 
Main explanatory variables 
 
Broadband lines, 
bb_lines  
(bb_lines_w) 
Number of total retail broadband connections based on 
DSL and coax cable enabling higher than 144 Kbit/s 
download speed but excluding FTTs lines  
(normalized to total number of households) 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard(c) 
Cable lines, 
cable  
 
Number of total retail broadband coax lines run by 
entrants by means of cable TV access  
(normalized to total retail broadband lines) 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard(c) 
Extent of broadband 
access regulation, 
sbc_bb  
Share of regulated lines (unbundling local loop (ULL), 
bitstream, resale) to total retail broadband lines 
(excluding cable entrant lines) 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard(c) 
Average total cost 
for full LLU, 
price_ull  
Monthly average total cost for full ULL in € EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard(c) 
Share of LLU lines, 
ms_llu  
Share of unbundled local loop lines to total retail 
broadband lines 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard(c) 
Fixed legacy, 
legacy  
Total number of active fixed landlines per 100 inhabitants. 
An active line connects the subscriber’s terminal 
equipment to the public switched telephone network 
PSTN lines 
©ITU(d)
Mobile-to-fixed 
ratio, 
fms  
Share of the total number of mobile lines to the total 
number of fixed lines 
©MarketLine(e)
RDI24-broadband 
index, 
rdi_bb  
The RDI24-Broadband Index is a subindex of the RDI24-
Total Index, measuring only regulation related to 
broadband infrastructure 
Polynomics(f)
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Variable Description Source*
 
Demand control variables 
 
Businesses with 
LAN, 
bus_use_lan 
Share of a country’s businesses that have a local area 
network (LAN) 
©Euromonitor(b)
Internet users, 
int_user  
Share of a country’s population that is using the Internet ©Euromonitor(b)
Education, 
edu 
Total number of graduates in all programmes in ‘000 
persons 
©Euromonitor(b)
GDP per capita, 
gdp_pc_ppp  
GDP per capita and PPP adjusted in current US$ World Bank(g)
 
Cost control variables 
 
Building permits, 
mdwell_perm 
Building permits for two and more dwellings as annual 
index normalized to 100 in 2010 
Eurostat(h)
Hourly wage, 
wage 
The manufacturing wage per hour in € and current prices 
with fixed 2012 exchange rates 
©Euromonitor(b)
Labour cost, 
labcost_con  
Annual labour cost index for the Construction branch by 
NACE Rev. 2 normalized to 100 in 2008. The index 
measures the development of the total cost, on an hourly 
basis, for employing the labor force, including wages and 
salaries, social security contributions, taxes, excluding 
subsidies 
Eurostat(h)
Urban population, 
urban_share  
Population of a country that lives in an urban environment 
as percentage of the total population  
©MarketLine(e)
* Note that some sources are commercially available only (©), while others are publicly available. (a) 
FTTH Council Europe is a non-profit industry organization, the aim of which is to enforce the deployment 
of fibre-optic technology in Europe. Data are collected by IDATE (www.idate.org) through desk research, 
direct contact with FTTx players, information exchange with FTTH Council Europe members and from 
IDATE partners. FTTH Council Europe provides annual data for the years from 2005 to 2013. Annual data 
for the independent variables (sources (b) to (h)) are available for the years from 2004 to 2012. (b) The 
Euromonitor International database is available at: http://www.euromonitor.com/. (c) The EU “Digital 
Agenda Scoreboard” is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/-
library/communications_reports/index_en.ht. There are missing values for Bulgaria and Romania for the 
years from 2004 to 2005. (d) The ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database is available at: 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. (e) Data are available at: 
http://advantage.marketline.com/PageForbidden?returnUrl=%2F. (f) The Polynomics Regulation Index is 
available at: http://www.polynomics.ch/rdi.php. (g) The World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” 
are available at: http://data.worldbank.org. (h) Data are available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/information_society/data/database.  
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Table A.2: Summary statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fttx_total 270 2072843 4706856 1 3.75e+07 
ln(fttx_total) 270 10.63032 5.608084 0 17.43946 
fttx_total_w 270 .1315215 .1648317 1.21e-08 .7351943 
ln(fttx_total_w) 247 -5.789674 5.302496 -18.22869 -.4238326 
fttx_sub 270 316400.6 668623.5 1 5144100 
ln(fttx_sub) 270 9.32781 4.685692 0 15.45336 
bb_lines 267 3723236 5769546 13738 2.80e+07 
bb_lines_w 267 .1904645 .0973223 .0023487 .4044925 
cable 254 .2157732 .1649066 0 1 
sbc_bb 239 .194315 .197063 0 .9705678 
price_ull 239 11.72037 4.383839 5.34 42 
ms_ull 239 .1014437 .1406279 0 .6772212 
i_price_ull_sh 254 1.112611 1.496397 0 7.07019 
legacy 243 40.88424 12.98943 15.98503 66.38055 
fms 269 3.375306 1.669958 1.2819 10.9396 
rdi_bb 243 .6995885 .322663 0 1 
bus_use_lan 270 .7118741 .1566787 .231 .996 
int_user 270 .6368203 .1846024 .1500006 .951 
edu 243 68.96461 13.13021 26 86.6 
gdp_pc_ppp 243 29783.69 13548.51 8730.803 89055.8 
mdwell_perm 243 161.4842 134.003 12.54 913.39 
wage 269 11.06208 7.875111 .8 38.7 
labcost_con 243 95.7 14.85244 39.8 134.7 
urban_sh 270 72.43043 11.89043 49.4118 97.4945 
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